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Effective Medical Surplus Recovery
We analyze not-for-profit Medical Surplus Recovery Organizations (MSROs) that manage the recovery of
surplus (unused or donated) medical products to fulfill the needs of underserved healthcare facilities in the
developing world. Our work is inspired by an award-winning North American non-governmental organization
(NGO) that matches the uncertain supply of medical surplus with the receiving parties’ needs. In particu-
lar, this NGO adopts a recipient-driven resource allocation model, where it grants recipients access to an
inventory database, and each recipient selects products of limited availability to fill a container based on
its preferences. We first develop a game theoretic model to investigate the effectiveness of this approach.
This analysis suggests that the recipient-driven resource allocation model may induce competition for MSRO
supplies among recipients and lead to a loss in value provision through premature orders. Accordingly, we
provide a number of operational mechanisms that can help MSROs deal with this problem. These mecha-
nisms are: (i) appropriately selecting container capacities while limiting the inventory availability visible to
recipients and increasing the acquisition volumes of supplies, (ii) eliminating recipient competition through
exclusive single-recipient access to the MSRO inventory, and (iii) focusing on learning about recipient needs
as opposed to providing them with supply information, and switching to a provider-driven resource alloca-
tion model. We use real data from the NGO by which the study was inspired and show that the proposed
improvements can substantially increase the value an MSRO provides to its recipients.
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1. Introduction
Healthcare facilities in the United States throw away 5.9 million tons of reusable medical products
every year (Berry 2014). Also known as medical surplus, these reusable products include leftovers
from post-surgical procedures, unopened clinical kits that are discarded due to regulatory require-
ments (EPA 40 CFR259.30 Regulated Medical Waste Act), and surplus or used hospital equipment.
Recognizing that these products can be used to provide healthcare for the underserved (Perry
and Malkin 2011), their recovery and shipment to healthcare facilities in developing countries is a
promising opportunity for the humanitarian aid world. This opportunity has resulted in the for-
mation of a unique reverse supply chain concept, where the recovery and redistribution of medical
surplus (excluding perishables such as pharmaceuticals) is undertaken by Medical Surplus Recovery
Organizations (MSROs), who not only leverage unused medical products in hospitals in developed
countries but also work with corporate donation programs of medical equipment manufacturers
such as McKesson and Kimberly Clark to acquire unsold or returned medical equipment.
1
2While the opportunity to allocate medical surplus to the underserved regions of the world is
immense, field studies on MSROs suggest that the lack of operational expertise to match recipient
demand and the uncertain supply is a major concern for MSROs (Compton 2012a, Howitt et
al. 2012, Kotsi et al. 2014). MSRO supply chains face unique operational challenges that differ
from traditional for-profit supply chains: First, the MSRO objective is not profit maximization
(recipients do not pay for the goods supplied by the MSROs). Rather, MSROs aim to maximize
value provision to their recipients. Second, due to their non-profit nature that heavily relies on
donations, MSROs operate in cash-constrained environments (Beta 2012), and cost effectiveness is
a key objective for an MSRO. Hence, MSROs aim to maximize the value provided to recipients by
shipping full containers because container shipments are a major operational cost category. Third,
medical surplus flow into MSROs is often limited, uncertain and not controllable; MSROs do not
have a formal procurement or production function as in a traditional supply chain. Fourth, MSROs
serve large recipient bases with a diversity of needs that dynamically change, where anticipating
the exact needs of recipients can be challenging.
In sum, the problem faced by MSROs is to maximize value provision to their recipients in the
absence of controllable supply, with limited information as to recipient needs, in a cash-constrained
environment. This is a challenging environment where innovative operating models tailored to these
conditions are needed to maximize value provision. The limited information about recipient needs
is a particularly important barrier, resulting in major loss of effectiveness in practice: The World
Health Organization (WHO) estimates that over seventy percent of donated medical equipment was
inappropriate for the beneficiaries (Howitt et al. 2012). The inspiration for this study, a Southern
US-based MSRO, referred to as Beta (name disguised for confidentiality), has developed a recipient-
driven resource allocation model to address this concern: Beta allows its recipients to determine
the content of shipments they are to receive. In particular, once Beta secures funding for container
shipments to particular recipients through monetary (or in-kind service) donations, it provides
them with online access to inventory information. The recipients then determine their container
content based on their preferences and needs. Essentially, the Beta model relies on recipients’ need
assessment by providing them with the opportunity to select their own supplies to minimize the
potential supply and demand mismatch in this challenging environment. Beta has recovered more
than 2 million pounds of medical surplus to date through an extensive network of partnerships
with a variety of entities in the healthcare industry and has shipped more than one thousand
40-foot containers to a diverse set of recipients. These containers have typically served distinct
medical facilities in developing countries and humanitarian organizations running development (and
occasionally, disaster response) programs in different parts of the world, including the Middle East,
South America and Africa. Beta is recognized for its operational excellence, as demonstrated by
3numerous operational excellence awards it has received, thanks to its focus on the recipient-driven
approach.
Our objective in this paper is to provide an operational roadmap for MSROs by building and
improving upon Beta’s operational model. In particular, we aim to investigate: (i) When a recipient-
driven resource allocation model is a good operational practice for an MSRO, and (ii) Whether
any operational mechanisms can be used to improve upon the effectiveness of recipient-driven
MSRO operations. We address these questions in two steps: We first model the recipient-driven
resource allocation model of Beta using a game-theoretic model, which takes into account the
perspectives of recipients that are given simultaneous access to Beta’s inventory. This analysis
suggests that when recipients’ needs are time sensitive, the recipient-driven allocation model works
at its best. Otherwise, i.e., when the recipients can afford to wait longer for MSRO supplies, we
identify a potential source of effectiveness loss under the recipient-driven resource allocation model.
In particular, we find that competition among recipients induced by simultaneous multi-recipient
access to an MSRO’s inventory can result in a reduction in value provision.
This finding is supported by an analysis of order data obtained from Beta, which suggests that
recipient-driven resource allocation may lead the recipients to fill their containers very fast with
lower value items even if they can afford to wait longer for MSRO supplies. Our analysis also
demonstrates that certain operational mechanisms can be used to overcome this loss of effective-
ness under the recipient-driven resource allocation model. These mechanisms are (i) limiting the
inventory availability visible to recipients, (ii) appropriately selecting container capacities, (iii)
increasing the acquisition volume of supplies, and (iv) eliminating recipient competition through
exclusive single recipient access to the MSRO inventory. Alternatively, provided that the MSRO
can build the capability to assess recipient needs, focusing on learning about recipient needs as
opposed to providing them with supply information and switching to a provider-driven resource
allocation model can improve the MSRO’s value provision capability. Our investigation regarding
the value of these operational mechanisms using the data from Beta suggests that they can help
MSROs substantially improve their value provision capabilities.
These results collectively suggest that well-established supply chain management principles may
not translate to the MSRO context or may need adaptation to generate value. For example, it is
known that a “pull” model has inventory management and demand-supply matching advantages
in a traditional supply chain. However, this concept cannot be fully applied to the MSRO setting
because the MSRO does not produce or buy items to recipient specifications. Instead, it can
be applied by giving the recipient control of which items it orders from existing inventory by
sharing inventory information. In implementing this idea, common wisdom from supply chains
would suggest full inventory visibility is ideal. Yet full information visibility accelerates premature
4ordering in this context. Moreover, the level of simultaneous access to information needs to be
controlled because the potential recipient competition prevents recipients from waiting for the
arrival of preferable items. Rather, information provision in the reverse direction appears to be more
valuable in the MSRO setting: That is, learning about recipient needs (as opposed to providing
supply information to the recipients) can substantially improve an MSRO’s value provision.
2. Literature Review
This work draws on and contributes to the operations management (OM) literature that deals with
allocation of scarce resources in the presence of uncertainty. Contrary to a conventional operational
setting, in which the uncertainty in demand can often be mitigated by inventory or capacity as
hedges, our work looks at a particular setting in which the demand is ample while the supply is often
limited, uncertain and uncontrollable, a distinguishing characteristic of the MSRO environment.
Our work is closely related to the recently growing literature on medical surplus allocation, which
typically documents best practices in the field through white papers produced within the MSRO
community (Compton 2011, 2012b). This work has so far focused on measuring recipients’ medical
surplus utilization rates and how surplus recovery data can improve supply chains for the operating
room (MacRae 1997, Rosenblatt and Silverman 1994, Rosenblatt et al. 1997). Yet, an investigation
regarding the effectiveness of different resource allocation practices has not been explored to date
in the medical surplus context (Kotsi et al. 2014), despite recipient-driven allocation being touted
as an exemplary approach. In this paper, we fill this void by exploring the effectiveness of the
recipient-driven resource allocation approach, and identifying a number of operational mechanisms
that can be used to further improve the welfare provision capability of MSROs.
Our contribution also relates to the stream of research that focuses on resource allocation in
healthcare, particularly those that deal with organ transplantation. In this context, organ scarcity
and large recipient bases are key concerns, and the fact that potential organ recipients have decision
rights in the organ allocation process (Su and Zenios 2004, 2005, Zenios et al. 2000, Akan et al. 2012,
Bertsimas et al. 2013) resembles the characteristics of the recipient-driven resource allocation model
in an MSRO setting. A key distinction between the two settings is that organ recipients have organ
refusal rights, which may lead the recipients to decline an available offer and wait for a better one,
leading to a loss in value provision stemming from the perishable nature of the donations. In the
recipient-driven allocation model of MSROs, however, the main source of allocation effectiveness
loss stems from recipients’ premature ordering behavior, i.e., not waiting for items that may be
a better fit for their needs. This is because recipient-driven medical surplus allocation implies a
constrained environment where recipients compete to be the first to fill a container using a mix of
multiple product categories before others, leading to container mixes that may contain products
of little value for the recipients.
5Our work also relates to the recently growing stream of research that deals with resource allo-
cation problems in the broader humanitarian logistics field (see Altay and Green (2006), Van
Wassenhove (2006), Van Wassenhove and Pedraza Martinez (2011), Kunz and Reiner (2012) for
overviews) that relate to disaster preparedness and last-mile distribution. To name a few studies
in the context of disaster preparedness, Salmeron and Apte (2010) and Duran et al. (2011) explore
the pre-disaster establishment of capacity and resources to maximize post-disaster humanitarian
aid; O¨zdamar et al. (2004) use a vehicle routing framework to develop models that optimally
construct resource dispatch plans for humanitarian platforms to minimize unmet humanitarian
demand; Bhattacharya et al. (2014) focus on coordinating multiple aid programs to maximize social
welfare through the design of procurement and allocation systems for expensive resources; Ergun
et al. (2013) analyze the value of collaboration across multiple humanitarian agencies; Pedraza
Martinez et al. (2010) and Besiou et al. (2014) investigate vehicle and fleet management issues.
To name a few studies in the context of last-mile distribution (see de la Torre et al. (2012) for
a recent overview), Huang et al. (2012) propose and develop heuristics to explore the joint prob-
lem of vehicle routing and supply allocation decisions under cost, speed and equity trade-offs; and
Balcik et al. (2008) have a cost efficiency focus in developing resource delivery schedules to min-
imize transportation costs in a centralized decision making system (unlike our work, which has
a value provision/effectiveness focus and compares decentralized and centralized decision making
approaches); while Natarajan and Swaminathan (2014) and Taylor and Xiao (2014) analyze inven-
tory control and distribution channel management problems under funding constraints. We differ
from these two streams of work in two dimensions. First, they typically focus on managing con-
trollable resources to maximize humanitarian benefits, whereas we focus on an environment with
uncertain and uncontrollable supplies. Second, they focus on the NGO perspective, i.e., generally
NGOs are the only and centralized decision makers. In our analysis, recipient decisions matter and
we evaluate the effectiveness of empowering recipients in resource allocation.
We also note that the provider-driven resource allocation model we propose relates to the ven-
dor managed inventory concept that has recently been popular in the humanitarian context. Also
known as pousse-pousse or informed-push model, the contraceptive distribution program in Sene-
gal (Daff et al. 2014) develops supply chain competencies among upstream policy-makers, allowing
doctors to focus on clinical issues. To reduce stockouts, operational decisions such as warehouse
item-mix, delivery schedules, and quantity decisions at each point-of-sale are built upon consump-
tion and utilization data collected from drivers delivering medical supplies. In a similar approach,
the USAID-Deliver project piloted the Direct Delivery and Information Capture system to dis-
tribute items to selected service points in the Ebonyi and Bauchi states of Nigeria. Serving as
mobile warehouses, trucks carrying pre-determined quantities of health supplies are accompanied
6by an expert who inspects storage space, counts on-hand inventories and enters the data into a
specifically-designed database for decision making. It is nevertheless important to note that this
setting considers controllable supply to a large extent, while the problem faced by MSROs is differ-
ent due to the uncertainty in the volume and arrival times of supplies. Nevertheless, our analysis
supports the view that keeping the decision rights on the NGO side can help significantly improve
welfare provision.
Finally, our research relates to traditional operations management research with respect to
rationing policies under limited supply (Cachon and Lariviere 1999), the value of information
sharing (Gavirneni et al. 1999, Cachon and Fisher 2000), and push versus pull comparison perspec-
tives (Hopp and Spearman 2008). The problem of supply rationing among multiple downstream
customers and the gaming between suppliers and customers is well-studied in the operations com-
munity (Cachon and Lariviere 1999). The problem faced by MSROs, however, is substantially
different from the traditional for-profit setting due to the welfare maximization perspective that an
NGO takes facing uncertain supplies with limited control and demand that is always larger than
supplies. As opposed to the strategically increased order sizes in the traditional setting (Cachon
and Lariviere 1999), the gaming under the MSRO’s recipient-driven resource allocation model leads
to premature orders with suboptimal container mixes. It is also well known that pull models have
inherent advantages over push models in for-profit supply chains as they establish limits on the
work-in-progress inventory levels (Hopp and Spearman 2008) and that information sharing across
the supply chain can help significantly improve the supply-demand match (Gavirneni et al. 1999,
Cachon and Fisher 2000). What we observe in the MSRO context is that these basic insights in
traditional supply chain settings do not necessarily apply in the allocation of medical surplus.
Rather, the two following deviations from for-profit supply chains appear to be key: (i) Relying
on recipients’ wisdom through information sharing can result in loss of effectiveness due to the
inherent recipient competition this practice may induce, and (ii) For MSROs, a push model may
outperform a pull model, provided that recipient need assessment is cost-effective.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §3, we present a stylized model that allows
us to characterize the fundamental trade-offs in a recipient-driven MSRO setting and propose a
number of operational improvement opportunities for MSROs. §4 identifies two new approaches to
eliminate the drawbacks of recipient competition under the recipient-driven allocation model, and
§5 uses real-life data to quantify the impact of proposed improvement approaches. §6 concludes
with a discussion of insights, implications for practice and future research.
3. Recipient-Driven Resource Allocation
We first develop and analyze a basic recipient-driven allocation model (R), which mimics the oper-
ational infrastructure of Beta and allows us to capture the key trade-offs faced by an MSRO in
7a recipient-driven setting. In practice, Beta first secures funding for container shipments through
donations. After that, recipients chosen by Beta are given online access to Beta’s inventory infor-
mation (typically two recipients have access at a time). These recipients then select their container
content based on their needs. Once a full container order is completed by a recipient and confirmed
by Beta, the inventory database is updated, and the other recipient in the system has to make its
selections from the updated database. Accordingly, to mimic Beta’s business model in a discrete-
time setting, we consider an MSRO that serves two recipients by maintaining inventories of two
product categories (referred to as items) over two periods t = 0,1 (see Appendix A for a multiple
item generalization). The two recipients are provided simultaneous access at time t = 0. New items
arrive at time t= 1.
Specification of the Game: We consider a two-stage dynamic simultaneous move game in which two
recipients in distinct locations have access to the MSRO inventory. At t= 0, the inventory levels
of both items (µ1 and µ2) and the container capacity K are known to all parties. To avoid trivial
scenarios, we assume that µ1 +µ2 ≥K (a container can be filled with the available inventory); and
µ1, µ2 <K (the container mix can be improved for both recipients by waiting until t= 1). At t= 1,
a new batch of supplies arrives and increases the availability of items by = (1, 2). We assume
that the inventory is non-perishable, hence the supplies only increase unless a container is shipped
to a recipient. This assumption reflects Beta’s acquisition guidelines, where products are acquired
only if their time to expiration exceeds 12 to 18 months, during which they are typically depleted
due to Beta’s rapid turnover rates.
Recipient Valuations of Items: Let vi,j denote the value of item j for recipient i. We say that
item j = 1,2 is high-value for recipient i = 1,2 if vi,j > vi,−j. We assume that the recipients are
heterogeneous in their preferences, and without loss of generality recipient i prefers item i, i.e.,
v1,1 > v1,2 and v2,1 < v2,2. For simplicity, we assume that the recipients’ valuations are public
information.1
Action Space and Strategy Profiles. We denote the action space of recipient i at time t= 0 to be
{O,W}, where O stands for ordering at t= 0, and W for waiting (i.e., ordering at t= 1). We denote
the set of pure strategy profiles at t= 0 to be S = {(S1, S2)}, where S1 stands for the action chosen
by recipient 1, and S2 for the action chosen by recipient 2. As such, S consists of four possibilities:
(O,O), (O,W ), (W,O) and (W,W ). Given K and µ= (µ1, µ2) at t= 0, recipients simultaneously
choose either to order or to wait. If only one of the recipients (call it i) orders at t= 0, the game
1 Results available from the authors show that the main insights continue to hold in an extension where we consider
a game of incomplete information in which recipient valuations are private information.
8stops. Recipient i chooses order volume yi = (yi,1, yi,1) so as to maximize the container value it
receives, pi0i , where
pi0i
.
= max
yi,1,yi,2
vi,1yi,1 + vi,2yi,2
s.t. yi,1 ≤ µ1, yi,2 ≤ µ2, yi,1 + yi,2 ≤K. (1)
Given the assumptions above, it is straightforward to see that pi0i = vi,iµi + vi,−i(K −µi) = ∆iµi +
vi,−iK, where ∆i
.
= vi,i − vi,−i. Meanwhile, recipient −i does not receive a container and obtains
zero payoff. This assumption is a simplification for tractability, and allows us to study the main
effect of recipient competition.2
If both recipients order at t= 0, the MSRO chooses whom to ship to according to a tie-breaking
rule (see the Expected Payoff Description below for details). If both recipients wait,  realizes at
t = 1, both recipients order and the game stops. The MSRO selects a recipient according to the
same tie-breaking rule. If recipient i is selected, it orders yi,j, j = 1,2 that maximizes the container
value from ordering in the second period based on the following:
pi1i
.
= max
yi,1,yi,2
vi,1yi,1 + vi,2yi,2
s.t yi,1 ≤ µ1 + 1, yi,2 ≤ µ2 + 2, yi,1 + yi,2 ≤K. (2)
It is easy to show pi1i = ∆imin(µi + i,K) + vi,−iK. Again, we assume the other recipient obtains
zero payoff.
Expected Payoff Description. For a given strategy profile (S1, S2)∈ S, we denote ΠS1,S2i as recipient
i’s total expected discounted payoff. To complete the payoff description, let p represent the recipi-
ents’ belief of the probability that recipient 1 will be chosen according to the tie-breaking rule, and
that this belief is consistent with the MSRO’s actions. Then, under simultaneous ordering, recipient
i expects to receive a container with probability pi and to not receive a container otherwise, where
p1 = p and p2 = 1−p. This formulation is inspired by the MSRO we work with. Beta has a priority
score for each recipient that is based on multiple factors such as the health needs assessment and
the security risk of the country the recipient is from. Some of these factors, however, may not be
known in advance. For instance, the political or civil stability of a recipient’s country or customs
clearance conditions can change the MSRO’s preference between these recipients. The allocation
probability p represents such randomness in the MSRO’s decision heuristic (which we refer to as a
tie-breaking rule). If there were no uncertainty in these factors, a deterministic priority score could
be used to determine who gets the container when the two recipients order at the same time. In this
2 Results available from the authors show that the main insights continue to hold in an extension where a second
container can be shipped to the second recipient in the second period.
9case, the allocation probability p would be either zero or one. In sum, through the probability p we
allow a more general (although stylized) representation of the recipient selection process subject
to random factors that are not known in advance but determine who gets the container.
Table 1 shows the total expected discounted payoffs of all strategy profiles. The table is con-
structed as follows: If both recipients order, ΠO,Oi = pipi
0
i represents the expected payoff of recipient
i, since recipient i expects to get his desired shipment value pi0i with probability pi and zero
payoff otherwise. If one of the recipients waits, then the ordering recipient is allocated his order
(ΠO,W1 = pi
0
1, Π
W,O
2 = pi
0
2) and the other recipient’s payoff is 0. Finally, Π
W,W
i = δpiE[pi
1
i ] repre-
sents the expected discounted payoff for recipient i whenever both recipients wait at t= 0. Here
δ is a discount factor that captures the time value of the value provided to the recipients. This
parameter can depend on a variety of factors. For instance, it would be substantially smaller in a
disaster response setting when compared to a development setting. Likewise, it could depend on
the baseline capabilities of a recipient: A hospital with a substantially higher budget could have a
higher δ or another hospital that needs to deal with an epidemic could have a lower δ. In essence,
δ is an abstraction of such factors into one single parameter in our stylized model. For ease of
exposition, we assume that both recipients have the same δ. Our results can be extended to dif-
ferent discount factors without modifying the insights. Accordingly, for any given strategy profile
(S1, S2), we define the total welfare provision of the MSRO under the recipient-driven model as
W S1,S2R = Π
S1,S2
1 + Π
S1,S2
2 , representing the total expected welfare provided to the two recipients.
Table 1 Payoff matrix under recipient-driven resource allocation.
Recipient 2
Order Wait
Recipient 1
Order ΠO,O1 ,Π
O,O
2 Π
O,W
1 ,0
Wait 0,ΠW,O2 Π
W,W
1 ,Π
W,W
2
Given the model set-up, we now define a concept that we will use throughout our analysis:
The (conditional) value of waiting for a recipient at t= 0 is the difference between the expected
discounted value of waiting to order at t= 1 and the value of ordering at t= 0 given that the other
recipient waits. The value of waiting (as inferred from Table 1) for recipient 1 and recipient 2 can
be respectively written as:
ΠW,W1 −ΠO,W1 and ΠW,W2 −ΠW,O2 . (3)
We next present a useful benchmark with a single recipient i that has exclusive access to the
MSRO inventory. In that case, it is straightforward to show that the recipient waits to order at
t= 1 if and only if pi0i < δE[pi
1
i ], or
δ > δ¯i
.
=
pi0i
E[pi1i ]
=
∆iµi + vi,−iK
E[∆imin(µi + i,K) + vi,−iK]
. (4)
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In this case, it is clear that if they were given exclusive access to the MSRO inventory, both
recipients would wait if δ >max(δ¯1, δ¯2). We next characterize the equilibrium under recipient-driven
allocation, for which the condition δ >max(δ¯1, δ¯2) serves as an important benchmark. A summary
of key notation for the model variables is provided in Table 2.
Table 2 Summary of key notation.
Notation Description
K Container capacity.
µi Inventory level of item i at t= 0, i= 1,2.
i Amount of new arrivals of item i at t= 1, i= 1,2.
vi,j Value of item j for recipient i, i= 1,2, j = 1,2.
pi Recipients’ belief of the probability that recipient i will be chosen for tie-breaking.
pi0i Optimal container value for recipient i from receiving a container at t= 0, i= 1,2.
pi1i Optimal container value for recipient i from receiving a container at t= 1, i= 1,2.
δ¯i A threshold for recipient i, which is equal to pi
0
i /E[pi
1
i ], i= 1,2.
δ Discount factor.
ΠS1,S2i Recipient i’s total expected discounted payoff for a given strategy profile (S1, S2)
W S1,S2R Total expected discounted value provision for a given strategy profile (S1, S2) under R model.
3.1. Equilibrium Characterization of the R Model
Proposition 1. There exist two possible equilibria under the R model: (O,O) and (W,W ).
(O,O) is always an equilibrium, and (W,W ) is an equilibrium if δ > δ¯
.
= max( δ¯1
p1
, δ¯2
p2
). Furthermore,
WW,WR >W
O,O
R if δ >max(δ¯1, δ¯2).
Proposition 1 states that a Nash equilibrium always exists under recipient-driven allocation and
is sustained by strategy profiles where both recipients choose the same actions.3 Both players
ordering at t = 0 is always an equilibrium, while waiting can be sustained in equilibrium only if
δ > δ¯ ≥max(δ¯1, δ¯2). This characterization combined with the single-recipient benchmark allows us
to identify an important insight regarding the effectiveness of the R model: When δ ≤max(δ¯1, δ¯2)
(as defined in Equation (4)) both recipients ordering is the only equilibrium, and it is preferred
from a welfare point of view when δ is sufficiently small. That is, if the discount rate δ is sufficiently
small, i.e., recipient needs are very urgent, the R model is effective.
On the other hand, when δ >max(δ¯1, δ¯2), the effectiveness of the R model can be undermined by
recipient competition. This is because the (W,W ) equilibrium with higher welfare provision may
not exist in this range and more specifically when δ ∈ (max(δ¯1, δ¯2), δ¯), although the recipients would
3 All proofs are provided in Appendix B.
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have preferred waiting if they were given exclusive access to the MSRO inventory. Accordingly, in
what follows we restrict our analysis to the case with δ >max(δ¯1, δ¯2) to explore the implications of
recipient competition under the R model.
Assumption 1. δ >max(δ¯1, δ¯2).
Given this assumption and the equilibrium characterization in Proposition 1, the MSRO faces
two scenarios: (i) δ ∈ (max(δ¯1, δ¯2), δ¯) and (ii) δ > δ¯. In the first scenario, although waiting is optimal
for a recipient that does not face competition (per Assumption 1), only the (O,O) equilibrium
exists. In other words, the first scenario is an example of the well-known prisoner’s dilemma, and the
unique (O,O) equilibrium is an undesirable one from the MSRO perspective. The second scenario
presents an example of the stag-hunt game, where the MSRO observes two possible equilibria that
represent risk-dominance (the (O,O) equilibrium) and payoff-dominance (the (W,W ) equilibrium
that is welfare improving). The key observation from the MSRO perspective is that if δ > δ¯, the
Pareto-efficient payoff dominant (W,W ) equilibrium can exist. In this case, we assume that the
MSRO can serve as a coordination medium between recipients to make sure that the (W,W )
equilibrium is chosen.4 As such, our focus in what follows is to identify how the MSRO can offset
δ¯ to expand its ability to induce the (W,W ) equilibrium.
3.2. Inducing Recipient Waiting under the R Model
We start this section by noting that δ¯ depends on µ,K and , hereafter denoted by δ¯(µ,K,) where
appropriate. That is, the MSRO can organize its operational infrastructure to induce δ > δ¯ in the
recipient-driven allocation setting as long as there exist a set of (µ,K,) such that δ > δ¯(µ,K,).
In other words, the existence of the Pareto-efficient (W,W ) equilibrium depends on inventory levels
µ, container capacity K, and the arrival stream of items into the MSRO inventory (characterized
by the distribution of ). Accordingly, we next investigate whether and how an MSRO can use
these operational levers to increase its welfare provision through enabling the waiting equilibrium.
To do so, we first expand and rewrite Equation (3), i.e., the value of waiting. We present this
equation for recipient 1; the case for recipient 2 can be written in a similar fashion:
ΠW,W1 −ΠO,W1 = δpE[pi11]−pi01 =−(1− pδ)(Kv1,2 +µ1∆1) + δp∆1E[min(K −µ1, 1)]. (5)
Note that the first term on the right-hand side of the equality in Equation (5) is the value lost
by delaying the optimal container order at t= 0. The second term on the other hand is the value
gained by waiting for the arrival of the preferred items at t= 1. If the value gain is higher than the
value loss for both recipients, the (W,W ) equilibrium exists. Let G()
.
= {(K,µ) : δpiE[pi1i ]>pi0i ,∀i}
be the region where the (W,W ) equilibrium exists.
4 See Skyrms (2004) for a detailed discussion regarding coordination in the stag-hunt game.
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Proposition 2. G() 6=∅ is characterized by (i) K ∈ (Kˆ(µ), K¯(µ)) with respect to capacity K,
and (ii) µ∈ (0,I(K)) with respect to inventory µ. Furthermore, if ≤st ′, then G()⊆G(′).
Proposition 2 suggests that the recipient-driven allocation model R can only achieve Pareto-
efficiency if the container capacity is neither too high nor too low, the available inventory of either
item category is not too high, and the supply arrivals for either item category is sufficiently high.
A sketch of the proof for the capacity condition in Proposition 2 can be provided by examining
Equation (5). Note that the first term on the right hand side of this equation, −(1− p1δ)(Kv1,2 +
µ1∆1) is decreasing in K, and the second term δp1∆1(E[min(K−µ1, 1)]) is concave increasing in
K. Hence, the summation of the two terms results in an inverse U-shaped function of K, unless
the slope of the first term is too large, in which case G() =∅. Otherwise, it is straightforward to
show that (W,W ) is an equilibrium in the range of capacity where the inverse U-shaped function
takes positive values for both recipients. In turn, this analysis suggests that the container capacity
should be between a lower and upper bound such that both recipients can be induced to wait. The
intuition behind the capacity condition is that the value loss from delaying the shipment of non-
preferred items would be prohibitively high for larger capacity levels (i.e., the term −(1−p1δ)Kv1,2
is much larger in absolute terms if K is high), while waiting brings little value if the container
capacity is small, because the value increase through the arrival of the incoming preferred items is
limited by the capacity itself. Accordingly, waiting can be induced under the R model only if the
capacity level is within a certain range.
The inventory condition in Proposition 2 can also be explained by Equation (5). The first term on
the right-hand side of this equation is decreasing in the inventory level µ componentwise, and the
second term δp1∆1(E[min(K−µ1, 1)]) is a concave decreasing function of µ componentwise. Hence,
it is straightforward to show that the value of waiting is strictly decreasing in µ componentwise.
Consequently, if the inventory levels visible to the recipients are below certain thresholds, then
both recipients will wait. This observation suggests that one way for an MSRO to induce recipient
waiting could be to strategically censor the inventory availability information provided to the
recipients. That is, inventory information censoring, in the form of presenting lower than actual
inventories in the online database, could help induce recipient waiting.
The effect of the arrival distribution presented in Proposition 2 follows a stochastic ordering
argument, which suggests that a “larger” random arrival is more likely to induce waiting. The
intuition behind this result is conceptually the opposite of the inventory condition discussed above.
The second term in Equation (5) is larger when the arrival distribution is stochastically larger,
i.e., if the chance of larger arrivals into the MSRO inventory is higher, the value of waiting will be
higher and the recipients will be more likely to wait. The managerial implication of this result is
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that increasing the number of supply partners (which would increase the arrival volume but also
make it more variable) may have an additional benefit for an MSRO beyond the items’ inherent
value: increasing the value of waiting for the recipients and resulting in higher welfare provision by
inducing the waiting equilibrium.
Proposition 3. Let µ ≤ µ′, and Kˆ ′(µ), K¯ ′(µ) and I ′(K) be the bounds defining G(′) 6= ∅
where ′ ≥st . Then (Kˆ(µ′), K¯(µ′))⊆ (Kˆ(µ), K¯(µ)) and (Kˆ(µ), K¯(µ))⊆ (Kˆ ′(µ), K¯ ′(µ)). I(K) is
component-wise concave in K and I ′(K)≥ I(K).
Proposition 3 shows that the feasible capacity range to induce waiting by both recipients is larger
if the inventory levels are lower and the arrival distribution is stochastically larger. The inventory
levels that will induce waiting on the other hand are higher with a stochastically larger arrival
distribution, but non-monotonic in the capacity level.
In sum, this analysis implies that an aligned combination of the three operational levers (lower
inventory, higher arrival rates and intermediate ranges of dedicated container capacity) can avoid
premature ordering and improve value provision in the recipient-driven model. Of course, the ben-
efits of these choices would have to be weighed against their opportunity cost (e.g. transportation
cost increase if shipping in smaller containers, partial value loss from not providing full inventory
visibility, the cost of the effort of working with more partners). It is also important to note that
inducing waiting may not even be possible under the R model, as the existence of Kˆ(µ) and K¯(µ)
within feasible capacity bounds and a non-negative I(K) is not guaranteed. To shed light on why
this is the case, Proposition 4 provides a simple sufficient condition.
Proposition 4. (W,W ) cannot be induced if
vi,−i
vi,i
≥ piδ for any i.
The condition in this proposition suggests that if the value of the non-preferred item for either
recipient is close to the same for the preferred item, waiting cannot be induced. The intuition
behind this result follows from the value of waiting characterization in Equation (5). In particular,
note that the absolute magnitude of the first term on the right-hand side of the equality will be
higher if the value of the non-preferred item is sufficiently high, implying that the value of waiting
can be negative. In sum, Proposition 4 suggests that the recipient-driven allocation model, due
to the inherent competition it induces between recipients, cannot achieve the welfare improving
equilibrium if the recipient valuations of different product categories are too close to each other,
irrespective of the capacity, inventory or arrival rate levels observed by the MSRO.
This observation implies that the R model has limited potential to maximize an MSRO’s value
provision due to the inherent recipient competition it induces. Accordingly, under the circumstances
that prevent a welfare-improving waiting equilibrium under the R model, an MSRO that aims to
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maximize its value provision may need to eliminate recipient competition. We posit that there are
two ways to achieve this: One is to provide inventory access to one recipient at a time. Alternatively,
the MSRO could go beyond the boundaries of the R model and reverse the flow of information, i.e.,
as opposed to providing inventory information to the recipients, the MSRO could ask recipients
to provide information regarding their needs, and make container decisions on their behalf (i.e.,
switch to a push-based operational model). We investigate these two options in the next section.
4. Eliminating Recipient Competition
4.1. Single-Recipient Access (SR Model)
Consider the first option discussed at the end of §3, i.e., providing inventory access to one recipient
at a time, which is the simplest way to eliminate recipient competition under the R model. In
this case, it is straightforward to show that any recipient’s payoff will be at least as high as her
equilibrium payoff under the R Model (for any K, µ,  and δ), if the recipient has exclusive access
to the MSRO inventory. This argument is an immediate consequence of Proposition 1, which states
that the discount rate threshold above which any chosen recipient prefers to wait is lower than the
same under recipient competition. This proposition, along with the results in Proposition 2 also
directly implies that the ranges of capacity, inventory, and arrival volume for which the recipient
waits are larger under single-recipient access.
Now, assume that the MSRO selects the single recipient to provide inventory access to according
to the same tie-breaking rule as mentioned in §3, consistent with the belief p of the recipients.
We refer to this approach as the SR model. In this case, defining the chosen recipient i’s value
provision with exclusive MSRO inventory access as ΠSRi
.
= max(pi0i , δE[pi
1
i ]), the total expected
welfare provided by the MSRO under the single-recipient benchmark can be written as WSR =
pΠSR1 + (1− p)ΠSR2 . Defining WR as the equilibrium total expected welfare under the R model,
the following result formally states that the SR Model will increase the MSRO’s expected welfare
provision compared to the same under the R model.
Proposition 5. WSR ≥WR.
The practical implication of Proposition 5 is that an MSRO operating under the R model can
benefit from reducing the number of recipients that have simultaneous access to its inventory
database. Nevertheless, it is important to note that reducing the number of recipients with access
to MSRO inventory may also imply fewer recipients being served over a fixed period of time,
which is not captured by our stylized two-period model. There may also be organizational reasons
beyond the scope of our analysis (such as more donations, or better resource/personnel use of
the MSRO) that favor simultaneous multi-recipient access as well. In that case, choosing the R
model in conjunction with the operational mechanisms discussed above will help improve its welfare
provision.
15
4.2. Provider-Driven Resource Allocation (P ) Model
We now turn our attention to a scenario where the MSRO changes the direction of the information
flow, i.e., the MSRO no longer provides inventory information to the recipients, but acquires neces-
sary information regarding their needs, i.e., vi,j, i, j = 1,2. Accordingly, at t= 0, given vi,j, i, j = 1,2,
the MSRO has two options in our model: (i) place an order (and simultaneously select the recipient
with the higher payoff) or (ii) wait until the arrival of the next batch of supplies, which increases
the available inventory by . If the MSRO chooses to order at t= 0, it determines the volume of
items yi,j that maximizes the container value for each recipient i and selects the recipient with a
higher container value according to:
pˆi0
.
=max
i=1,2
max
yi,1,yi,2
vi,1yi,1 + vi,2yi,2
s.t. yi,1 ≤ µ1, yi,2 ≤ µ2, yi,1 + yi,2 ≤K. (6)
As before, if the MSRO waits, an additional volume  = (1, 2) of supply is received. Then, the
MSRO determines the volume of items yi,j that maximizes the container value for each recipient i
and selects the recipient with a higher container value according to:
pˆi1
.
=max
i=1,2
max
yi,1,yi,2
vi,1yi,1 + vi,2yi,2
s.t yi,1 ≤ µ1 + 1, yi,2 ≤ µ2 + 2, yi,1 + yi,2 ≤K. (7)
Then, the total expected discounted welfare provision under the P model can be written as
WP = max(pˆi
0, δE[pˆi1]). While we omit the technical details that characterize the optimal decisions
under the P model for brevity (results available from the authors), we next present a result that
formally establishes the dominance of the P model over the R model, which proves the value of
information flow reversal for MSROs.
Proposition 6. WP ≥WSR.
The intuition behind Proposition 6 is that while the SR model (which is readily better than
the R model) selects a recipient at t= 0 according to the tie-breaking rule that is independent of
inventory information and allows the recipient to choose when to order, the P model determines
which recipient to order for and what to order based on inventory information. As such, the P model
dominates the SR model, which follows from Jensen’s inequality. Given that welfare provision
under the SR approach dominates the same under the R model, the P model provides the highest
value to the recipient base. In sum, this analysis suggests that information flow from the recipients
to the MSRO combined with MSRO-driven resource allocation is the ideal scenario, provided that
recipient needs assessment is feasible. In particular, the benefit of the P model stems from the fact
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that it eliminates the potential for premature orders induced by recipient competition under the
pull-based R model.
A natural question at this point is whether gathering recipient needs information is feasible
for the MSRO to effectively exercise the P model. The WHO finding regarding the high level of
mismatched donations suggests this is not easy, but neither is it infeasible. For example, Beta tries
to evaluate recipient needs before a recipient qualifies for service so they have a basic understanding
of the categories of value to each recipient. They also have biomedical engineers that periodically
visit some recipients to help them install/maintain donated equipment and help validate the wish
lists provided by the recipients. Face The Challenge (FTC) is an organization highly regarded as
an ideal steward of provider-driven resource allocation. To identify the items that best meet their
recipients’ medical needs, FTC periodically sends doctors to visit recipients. Nevertheless, acquiring
such information can be costly, as it requires having personnel on the ground, and the cost will
increase with the size of the recipient base. Therefore, the information acquisition capability may
vary between MSROs depending on their resources and the size of their recipient base. In sum,
while reversing the information flow can be costly (especially if recipient needs evolve dynamically
over time and the recipient base is large and geographically dispersed as for Beta), our analysis
provides a basis for engaging in conversations with donors around the value of a provider-driven
allocation model to include such information gathering.
5. Numerical Analysis
In this section, we explore the effectiveness of the R model and assess the welfare improvement
potential of the mechanisms we propose by using medical surplus recovery data collected from Beta.
This data allows us to estimate model parameters (e.g., supply arrival rate, recipient-specific item
valuations, inventory levels and capacity), which we then use to investigate the potential value of
the operational mechanisms we propose in §3-4. The data is also useful for comparing the recipients’
ordering behavior with that of Beta: It was collected starting from January 2013 when Beta started
assisting recipients by filling the containers on the recipients’ behalf. This initiative was based on
Beta’s observation that recipient-driven orders were often rushed, with recipients frequently placing
seemingly useless items in their containers (Beta 2014). Accordingly, unlike the original operating
regime where recipients had full control over what was to be placed in their dedicated containers,
Beta terminated recipient access to inventory before the container was completely filled by the
recipient (by having the inventory access passwords expire), and filled the rest of the container on
the recipient’s behalf. This new approach allows us to compare Beta and the recipients’ ordering
behaviors at a container level.
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We describe the data in more detail below. After that, we compare Beta and recipients with
respect to their container fill behaviors and carry out an impact assessment of the proposed
improvements developed in §3-4.
5.1. Data
The data set contains shipment and packing list data from 36 containers shipped by Beta between
January 2013 and October 2014. During this period, Beta tracked information regarding 14,900
distinct items in its inventory database, spanning sixty-seven product categories. The shipment
data consists of details such as donor values of products (which represent the market value of those
products), weights of the selected products, quantities of each product type for each container
shipment, recipient names, transportation modes, container capacities, and shipment dates. The
data set was downloaded and provided by Beta in December 2014 for our analysis.
The packing list data consists of information regarding boxes of unique product categories, which
we consider as our unit of analysis, used to fill a container. In particular, this data contains three
date-related fields where every box goes through the following sequence: “Created”, “AddedTo-
OrderDate”, and “ConfirmedDate”. The “Created” time-stamp refers to the time when a box
became available in Beta’s inventory. At this time, recipients that have access to the inventory
database (or Beta) can place an order to place this box in the recipient’s container. Once a recip-
ient or Beta orders the box for the container, the ‘AddedToOrderDate” time-stamp is generated.
Finally, the “ConfirmedDate” time-stamp represents the date at which the container is filled up
and the boxes in the packing list are secured for a shipment to the specific recipient. In addition
to those, we also have information as to each recipient’s inventory database access permission
issue and end dates, and information regarding recipient characteristics. This data set allows us to
consolidate four pieces of key information that we utilize in our empirical investigation:
Arrival Rates: The first piece of information regards the arrival rate of products in each product
category. We determine the arrival rate (supply volume per day-between-arrivals) of each box type
using the “Created” time-stamps, and denote the arrival rate of a product category as the total
arrival rate for all box types in that category.
Inventory Levels: The second piece of information regards the inventory availability of each
product category. We determine the inventory levels by comparing the inflow of boxes through
the “Created” time-stamps, and outflow of the same by the “ConfirmedDate” time-stamp, along
with associated volumes. In our data, the earliest record of a box created comes from 2006 that
was picked by some recipient three years later. Therefore, the initial inventory levels used in our
analysis (as of January 2013) are retrospectively determined by supplies that have arrived since
2006 but that have not yet been ordered by any recipient.
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Valuations: The third piece of information is the value of each product category in Beta’s inventory
for recipients. A natural measure for this value is the donor value, i.e., the donor’s estimate of the
market value of a donated product. That is, one may expect higher market value items to be picked
more frequently by the recipients. An examination of the recipient orders reveals that recipients do
not necessarily place the highest market value items in their containers, which is a clear indication
that recipient needs may favor ordering lower market value items as well. To account for recipient-
specific, needs-based valuations of different product categories, we apply a recipient-choice based
adjustment to donor values, which provides an estimated inherent value for each recipient.
Our adjustment procedure ensures that the recipients’ actual ordering behavior in the data
matches the solution to the optimization problem in §3, and proceeds as follows: First, we analyze
the Beta inventory before and after a recipient’s order process is complete, and observe box types
whose inventories were depleted via the recipient’s order. We consider these as “critical” for the
recipient. The remaining box types in Beta’s inventory (with positive inventory level after the
recipient order), are then called “non-critical” for this recipient. We calculate the average donor
value of non-critical boxes that were picked by the recipient, and denote it as vnon. If the donor
value of a critical box is above vnon, we set the recipient valuation of that box to be its donor value.
Otherwise, we set the recipient valuation of that box to be slightly above (5 cents per lb.) vnon. For
a non-critical box that was picked by the recipient, we set the recipient valuation to be equal to
vnon. For a non-critical box that was not picked by the recipient, if the donor value is below vnon,
we set the recipient valuation to be its donor value. Otherwise, we set the recipient valuation to
be equal to vnon.
5 Once the valuations are obtained for every product category for each recipient,
we use them to estimate the value of every container filled by either Beta or its recipient. While
this approach is not unique, it is one that keeps recipient-specific values as close as possible to the
donor values (at most 2.91% more at a container level), while allowing our models to reproduce
the specific container mix selected by the recipients.
Order Placement Speed: The fourth piece of information regards the speed at which boxes were
placed by the recipients and Beta. For each recipient order, we obtain the recipient’s inventory
5 Consider an example where box types 1-5 are available, with donor values 25¢, 20¢, 40¢, 50¢, and 20¢/lb. For
simplicity, assume each box weighs 1lb. Assume recipient A orders boxes 2-5 and only boxes 4 and 5 are critical,
i.e., their inventory is depleted via recipient A’s order. In this case, the average value of non-critical boxes picked
by the recipient (i.e., boxes 2 and 3) is vnon = (20 + 40)/2 = 30¢. Box type 4 has a donor value 50¢> 30¢. As such,
we set recipient A’s valuation for box type 4 to its donor value 50¢. For box type 5, however, this is not the case.
Because 20¢ < 30¢, we set recipient A’s valuation for box type 5 to be 30 + 5 = 35¢. Second, we set A’s valuation
for non-critical boxes picked by the recipient (i.e., boxes 2 and 3) to be equal to vnon = 30¢. Finally, for box type 1,
since the donor value 25¢< 30¢, we set recipient A’s valuation for box type 1 to be its donor value 25¢. Therefore,
recipient A’s valuations for boxes 1-5 are adjusted to 25¢, 30¢, 30¢, 50¢, and 35¢/lb, respectively. Under this set of
valuations, depleting boxes 4 and 5 and filling the rest of the container with boxes 2 and 3, which matches recipient
A’s actual ordering behavior, is an optimal solution to recipient A’s value maximization problem.
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database access permission issue and end dates, which give us the recipient’s length of involvement,
i.e., the total time it took a recipient to place the chosen set of boxes in its container. We then
divide this number by the number of boxes placed by the recipient to calculate the rate at which
a recipient ordered boxes. We estimate Beta’s length of involvement, i.e., the total time it took for
Beta to place the chosen set of boxes in the recipient’s container, by calculating the time between
“AddedToOrderDate” values for the first and last boxes that were placed in a container by Beta.
Dividing this number by the number of boxes placed by Beta in that container gives us the rate
at which Beta placed boxes in containers.
5.2. Comparing Beta and Recipient Orders
Among the 36 containers filled during the period of analysis, 34 were filled jointly by Beta and
recipients, while two containers were filled only by Beta. We focus only on the jointly-filled ship-
ments, which allows us to compare Beta’s and recipients’ ordering behaviors matched at a container
level. Furthermore, we note that all these shipments were subject to simultaneous inventory access
by exactly two recipients. Table 3 provides the summary statistics for these containers.
Table 3 Summary statistics for the 34 shipments that were jointly filled by recipients and Beta, under
simultaneous two recipient access. Standard deviations are provided in parentheses.
Statistics Beta Recipient
# Observations 34 34
% Boxes filled 17 83
Total time to order, days
22.76 15.50
(18.33) (14.78)
Average time to order (per box), days
0.32 0.025
(0.31) (0.03)
Average $ value per box
262.56 136.70
(176.93) (33.37)
Using a paired t-test, we find that the rate at which recipients placed boxes in containers is
significantly faster than Beta (the average time to order a box is almost 11.8 times more for
Beta, t(33) = 4.84, p < 0.001).6 We also find that the average value of boxes placed by Beta is
significantly (92%) higher than that of a recipient (t(33) = 4.15, p < 0.001). In other words, there
is a significant difference between the container fill behavior of Beta and the recipients. Beta waits
longer and places boxes with higher estimated recipient value in recipient containers than the
recipients themselves. A natural question is: To what extent is the higher value in boxes placed
by Beta driven by the extended period of time taken to fill the container? We find that 95.30% of
the boxes placed by Beta were placed after the recipients’ inventory database access period, and
6 Note also that even the total time of involvement of Beta is significantly higher than that of the recipients, even
though Beta places significantly fewer boxes in containers: The total time of involvement for Beta (at a container
level) is on the average 7.3 days longer (t(33) = 1.82, p < 0.05) than the same for recipients.
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among those boxes 29.79% were of types that had zero inventory after recipient orders, and arrived
after the recipient’s inventory access period. This suggests that an important fraction of the value
added from waiting appears to be driven by the longer wait that allowed Beta to leverage new
arrivals into its inventory. Furthermore, the average estimated value of those boxes was $226.13,
significantly higher than that of an average box placed by the recipients ($136.70).
Collectively, these observations suggest that recipients order faster than Beta and do not wait
for the arrival of potentially more valuable items in the near future. Combined with Beta officials’
statements regarding the inefficiencies in the recipient orders, these observations give us reason to
believe that reducing or eliminating the pressure to place premature orders will create higher value
provision by the MSRO, which we investigate next. These observations also point to the value
of an in-depth empirical investigation of drivers of recipient ordering behavior based on a more
comprehensive data set, which is beyond the scope of this study.
5.3. Impact Analysis
We next perform a numerical analysis based on Beta data to quantify the value of the operational
improvements we proposed in §3 and 4. In particular, we first analyze the potential of the opera-
tional improvements to the R model in inducing recipient waiting. We then quantify the welfare
provision potential of the SR and P models.
5.3.1. Inducing the Waiting Equilibrium: Improvements to the R Model In this
section, we consider all 34 containers that were shipped during the period of interest. For each
shipment, we follow the model set-up used in §3 and consider a two-period analysis, where the
period length is half a month (based on the average recipient shipment period length of 15.5 days
in Table 1). We investigate whether the capacity adjustment, inventory visibility and arrival rate
change levers could be used to drive the recipient to wait longer if the traditional recipient-driven
model were in place. We let δ= 0.99,7 and assume egalitarian tie-breaking (i.e., p= 0.5).
To perform this analysis, we first estimate the arrival volume for each product category using
the historical arrival data on hand as described in §5.1, and assume that the arrivals are i.i.d. in
every period. The inventory level for each product category µj at the beginning of January 2013
is also calculated using the arrival and shipment dates of each product category. Each recipient
i’s valuation of each product category j (vi,j) is calculated using the procedure described in §5.1.
We consider the two capacity levels available to Beta in practice, 40- and 20-ft containers, which
correspond to approximately 10000 and 5000 lb. in a container, respectively.
7 This corresponds to 23% compounded annual discount. Additional analysis available from the authors shows that all
results presented in this section directionally hold under two alternative discount levels with δ = 0.95 and δ = 0.999.
These values were chosen to represent a range of δ values, as δ is difficult to estimate without having direct access to
the recipients’ particular conditions at the time of allocation.
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Before we proceed with a detailed analysis, we note that Beta’s realized container shipments are
not paired with perfect overlap as our model in §3 assumes. That is, Beta typically ships containers
to recipients one by one; after one recipient leaves, a new recipient is given access into the system.
In this way, although Beta consistently maintains two-recipient access throughout the observed
periods, the password issue and end dates differ between recipients. Accordingly, an equilibrium
analysis of the sort we perform in §3 is difficult to exercise, and we turn our attention to a proxy
measure, the value of waiting, to analyze the R model’s potential for inducing recipients to wait.
In particular, we calculate the value of waiting as per Equation (5) for all recipients in our data
set as a proxy for their likelihood of waiting.
With this data, we first consider the value of waiting under a hypothetical exclusive single-
recipient scenario (as in Equation (4)), which allows us to predict that 73.5% (i.e., 25 of 34) of
the recipients would have preferred to wait for another period to complete their container orders
(i.e., the value of waiting would be positive), had they been given exclusive inventory access.
This observation is in line with the results presented in §5.2, and suggests that there is room for
improvement through the operational mechanisms introduced in §3.
Accordingly, we next look for the potential of the operational mechanisms in inducing recipient
waiting. To do so, we first define a status-quo benchmark under the R model, which considers
the actual container shipments that realized, and calculates the value of waiting using the actual
shipment data, i.e., 40-ft containers and the actual inventory levels in Beta’s system at the time
the container fill process is completed. At this benchmark, the value of waiting averaged across
all realized shipments is given as $-54,512. To assess the change in the value of waiting when
the operational mechanisms we propose are exercised (i.e., different container capacity, inventory
level and arrival rates), we use the theoretically optimal container contents based on the model
formulation in §3, assuming the same inventory availability as when the container mix was selected
under the status-quo benchmark. A comparison between the status-quo benchmark and these
scenarios allows us to quantify the potential of these operational mechanisms in inducing recipient
waiting as follows.
We first look at the effect of capacity reduction on the average value of waiting across all recipients
by assuming a 20-ft container, which is the only practically viable option per Beta officials. We find
that such a capacity reduction leads to a 80.3% increase in the average value of waiting (-$10,749)
across all containers. The value of waiting with a 40-(20-) ft container is positive only for 11.8
(29.4) percent of the recipients, i.e., the number of recipients with positive value of waiting more
than doubles. We next investigate the value of inventory level adjustment and identify the range of
inventory level reduction that can induce waiting, which is illustrated in Figure 1. An immediate
observation from Figure 1 is that, the average value of waiting is positive at 38% visibility and
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Figure 1 The effect of inventory adjustment at 32− 42% of the benchmark inventory on the value of waiting
(in $1000s).
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(a) 40-ft Container.
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(b) 20-ft Container
Figure 2 The effect of increasing the procurement rate on the value of waiting (in $1000s).
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(b) 20-ft Container
below if a 20-ft container is utilized. In addition, at 38% of the benchmark inventory level, the value
of waiting with a 20-ft container is positive for 32.5 percent of the recipients. Next, we consider the
effect of increasing the procurement volume of products by Beta, i.e., we analyze whether further
effort by Beta to increase the inflow of goods by signing up more hospitals or corporate donors to
provide more medical surplus is an effective approach. Figure 2 shows that with a 20-ft container,
a positive average value of waiting can be obtained by increasing the procurement rate by 30%.
In addition, with a 30% increase in the procurement rate, the value of waiting is positive for 32.5
percent of the recipients. Consequently, the data collected from Beta suggests that the value of the
simple operational improvements we identified in §3 appear to be capable of affecting the recipients’
ordering behavior. Essentially, by using a combination of capacity adjustment, visible inventory
level decrease and procurement rate increase, Beta could decrease the competitive ordering pressure
on the recipients.
We also note that these operational improvements not only increase the value of waiting but
also change the average value in a container, which we define as the recipient value of a container
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in our model per lb. of capacity (i.e., pi0i /K) given the actual inventory levels at the time the
actual container fill process is completed. Similarly to the value of waiting calculation above, we
first calculate this measure at the status-quo benchmark for each container that shipped using
the actual shipment data (i.e., 40-ft container and the actual inventory levels). We note that
this value coincides with that in our formulation of the R model described in §3, because of the
item valuation estimation described in §5.1. We then calculate the same under the operational
improvement scenarios discussed above to observe the following: Capacity reduction leads to an
increased average value in a container, which is intuitive given the decreasing returns to scale due
to limited inventory availability of higher value items. In particular, a switch from the benchmark
with a 40-ft container to a 20-ft container increases the average value in the container by 32.3%
(from $12.20/lb to $16.14/lb). However, a reduction in the level of visible inventory reduces the
value provided by higher-value items, the lack of which leads to average value loss in the container.
In particular, the average value in a 40-ft container goes down to $10.4/lb at 38% of the current
inventory level, where the average value of waiting switches to a positive number.
5.3.2. The Value of Eliminating Recipient Competition We next estimate the effect of
eliminating recipient competition through the SR and P models on the MSROs value provision
capability. To do so, we adopt heuristic approaches (described below) that extend our two-period
two recipient models to multi-period multi-recipient analyses.
We start with the SR model heuristic, in which the MSRO provides inventory access to a single
recipient at any point in time by rescheduling the 34 shipments in consideration using the same
data as above over 42 ordering periods (i.e., 21 months). In this case, we assume that the MSRO
randomly determines which recipient to provide inventory access to, where the chosen recipient
is granted a 2-period access to the MSRO inventory and may choose to order at one of the two
ordering periods. Once it orders, inventory is reduced accordingly. In every period over the 42
periods, inventory is also increased by the actual arrival volume in that period. We continue this
procedure on a rolling horizon basis, and if all 34 shipments have not been completed over the
42 periods for which we have data, we continue the procedure based on inventory updates with
simulated supply arrival volumes until all recipients have been scheduled. Comparing the net
present average container value under this heuristic allocation with the same under the status-quo
R model benchmark (i.e., the actual container shipments) we find an increase of 168% in the net
present average container value (from $12.20/lb to $32.73/lb) under the SR model.
Next, we evaluate the value provision improvement under a P model heuristic. To do so, we
consider all 34 recipients in our data set and we derive an improved value provision (i.e., increased
average container value across all recipients) by having the MSRO reschedule the 34 shipments in
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consideration using the same data as above. As before, we use a heuristic approach on a two-period
rolling horizon basis that determines the provider-driven resource allocation in every period per
the model described in §4. We first use the available inventory and arrival data to compute the
optimal container order composition for each recipient at time t, starting from t= 1, and identify
the recipient that receives the highest payoff from ordering immediately. Next, we estimate the
expected discounted payoff from waiting for another period (i.e., 15.5 days) for each recipient. We
then compare the highest payoff from ordering immediately and the highest expected discounted
payoff from ordering in the next period. If the former exceeds the latter, we ship the corresponding
recipient’s container with its optimal container mix, update the inventory level of each product
category accordingly, and remove the particular recipient from the database. Otherwise, no order
is placed in that period, the inventory level is updated based on the realized supply arrival volume
in period t, and we move to period t+ 1. This algorithmic allocation procedure, which utilizes the
exact historical inventory and product arrival data from Beta, shows that the net present average
container value under this heuristic allocation is 265% higher than the same under the R model
(from $12.20/lb to $44.59/lb). From Beta’s perspective, this result clearly indicates the importance
of recipient needs assessment. It can also be helpful in comparing the value provision potential
of donor dollars spent towards container shipments versus learning about recipient needs, should
Beta consider implementing the provider-driven allocation approach.
6. Conclusion
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the majority of donated equipment was
inappropriate for the beneficiaries in the health sector (Howitt et al. 2012), and only eight percent
of recipients were estimated to work with MSROs in ensuring quality and sufficient knowledge
transfer to realize the full potential of the donated equipment (Compton 2012a). Hence, the need
for operations management research to improve the supply-demand match in this domain is clear
(Kotsi et al. 2014), and our objective in this paper is to provide operational guidelines to improve
resource allocation practices of MSROs.
Building on the recipient-driven resource allocation model of an award-winning MSRO, our
analysis provides the following insights for MSROs: When facing an impatient recipient base with
urgent needs, a recipient-driven model appears to be ideal. Otherwise, i.e., if recipients can afford to
wait for better supplies, the following operational improvement path should be considered: (i) the
supply-demand match for an MSRO can be significantly improved by a provider-driven resource
allocation model that relies on understanding the recipient needs. That is, a reversal in the direction
of information flow in the MSRO supply chain, which eliminates inventory information provision to
recipients (that the recipient-driven model relies on) and utilizes recipient needs information in the
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MSRO-driven container fill processes can help substantially improve the MSRO’s value provision.
However, given that MSROs operate in cash-constrained environments that rely on donations and
the fact that keeping up to date with detailed and potentially time-varying recipient needs can be
costly, this approach may require a strategic assessment by MSROs. In particular, it may require
engaging in conversations with donors around the value of investing in such information gathering
to manage donor expectations. (ii) If for whatever reason an MSRO is bound to remain in a
recipient-driven setting (e.g., recipient needs assessment is prohibitively expensive or the donors
require recipient-driven allocations), recipient competition for products in the MSRO inventory
may lead recipients to prematurely order a potentially suboptimal mix of supplies. If this is the
case, the first possible action an MSRO can take is to reduce the number of recipients that have
simultaneous inventory access to minimize the impact of recipient competition. However, this may
reduce the number of recipients that an MSRO can serve over a fixed period of time, which implies
that an MSRO that secures donations for many recipients at a time may be forced to provide
simultaneous multiple-recipient access. In that case, our analysis suggests that the potential loss
of effectiveness driven by competition can be partially avoided by a combination of operational
mechanisms such as reducing the visibility of available inventory, determining the appropriate
container capacity allocated to recipients, and increasing the arrival volume of supplies. We believe
the insights from our analysis can be valuable for MSROs operating in a development context
specifically, where the operational characteristics involve uncontrollable, time sensitive (but non-
emergency) and constrained multi-product supplies used to meet the uncertain needs of a large
recipient base.
The analysis in this paper can be extended in two important directions. First, many of the
insights derived from our stylized model can be extended to multi-period models with multiple
recipients. A key difference of the multi-period case from our stylized model with two periods
and a single container is that under the multi-period case, recipients who do not receive the first
container have the opportunity to receive a container in future periods; their payoff is not zero.
We verified that the main insights continue to hold in an extension to the two-period model where
a second container can be shipped to the second recipient in the second period, mimicking the
positive future payoff implicit in a multi-period setting. In other words, even with the possibility of
receiving a container in the future, the premature ordering behavior induced by competition still
exists, and the operational levers we propose, such as adjusting the inventory visibility, container
size and the arrival rates of products would still help induce waiting. However, a full analysis of
the multi-period case for the centralized problem (i.e., the provider-driven model) is intractable
since the decisions involve the sequencing of recipients under uncertain arrivals of multiple product
categories. Even the deterministic version of this problem with two product categories is at least
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as challenging as the Hamiltonian path problem. Analytically characterizing the welfare loss of
the recipient-driven model and the improvement of the proposed operational mechanisms for the
multi-period case is an interesting topic that we leave for future research.
Second, under circumstances where recipient needs assessment in the field is prohibitively expen-
sive, in order to implement a provider-driven model, one can investigate whether truth-inducing
mechanisms can be used to elicit the valuations or preferences of each recipient for different product
categories. It would be interesting to investigate whether a truth-inducing mechanism can achieve
the first best value provision (i.e., global optimal assuming the valuations of recipients are known),
and if not, to what extent a truth-inducing mechanism can improve the value provision over the
recipient-driven model, and what the welfare loss caused by the information gap would be.
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Appendix
A. Multiple-Item Model Extension
In this section, we extend the basic stylized model in §3 to a multiple-item model. Our main goal is to
obtain payoff expressions for every recipient that are used as inputs for representing recipient-driven resource
allocation in normal-form when more than two items are provided. To do so, we consider the following
modifications. First, the available inventory consists of m items with µj of item j at stage 1 (t= 0). Second,
vi,j denotes the value of item j for recipient i for 1≤ j ≤m.
Action Space and Strategy Profiles. The action space for recipient i remains as {O,W} with the set of
pure strategy profiles S consisting of four possibilities: (O,O), (O,W ), (W,O) and (W,W ). We define the
appropriate linear programs contingent on observing K, µ= (µ1, . . . , µm) and p. At stage 1, recipient i simul-
taneously chooses either to order or to wait. If recipient i orders, it simultaneously selects yi = (yi,1, . . . , yi,m)
to maximize its container value according to (8):
max
yi∈Rm+
vi,1yi,1 + vi,2yi,2 + . . .+ vi,myi,m
s.t. yi,1 ≤ µ1, . . . , yi,m ≤ µm,
m∑
j=1
yi,j ≤K. (8)
If either one or both recipients order, the game stops. If both recipients wait, an additional volume  =
(1, . . . , m) of supply is received over the period. At stage 2, both recipients order and recipient i selects
yi = (yi,1, . . . , yi,m) that maximizes its container value based on the new inventory levels:
max
yi∈Rm+
vi,1yi,1 + vi,2yi,2 + . . .+ vi,myi,m
s.t. yi,1 ≤ µ1 + 1, . . . , yi,m ≤ µm + m,
m∑
j=1
yi,j ≤K. (9)
The game stops. The solutions to (8) and (9) are respectively denoted by piti(µ
t), t = 0,1 where µ0 = µ
and µ1 = µ+ . To develop closed-form expressions to recipient i’s payoff piti(µ
t), we use bijections on the
set of item indexes to recipient-dependent ordering of vi,j so as to generalize recipient i’s preference. In
particular, the valuation of item τ−1(j) is ranked j for recipient i whenever there exists some bijection
τ : {1, . . . ,m}→ {1, . . . ,m} such that vi,τ−1(1) ≥ vi,τ−1(2) ≥ . . . vi,τ−1(m).
Payoff Description. For a given strategy profile (s1, s2) ∈ S, capacity K, and volume of items µ, we denote
Πs1,s2i,t (µ
t) as recipient i’s payoff at stage t+ 1. To complete Table 1, the result below allows us to specify
pi0i (µ) and E[pi
1
i (µ+ )].
Proposition 7. Let y∗i = (y
∗
i,1, . . . , y
∗
i,m) and suppose there exists some τ on {1, . . . ,m} such that vi,τ−1(j)
is non-increasing in j. If recipient i orders, then the optimal solution to (8) is given by
y∗i,j =

µj , if j ∈Aτ ;
K −∑τ−1(m˜−1)j=1 µj , if j = τ−1(m˜);
0, otherwise.
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If the recipient waits, then the optimal solution to (9) is given by
y∗i,j =

E
[
min
([
K −∑j−1
l=1 (µτ−1(l) + τ−1(l))
]+
, µj + j
)]
, if j ∈Aτ ;
K −∑τ−1(m˜−1)
j=1 y
∗
i,j , if j = τ
−1(m˜);
0, otherwise .
where Sk(τ) =
∑k
j=1 µτ−1(j), m˜= inf{k≤m | Sk(τ)>K} and Aτ = {τ−1(1), . . . , τ−1(m˜− 1)}.
Given that µτ−1(1) + . . .+µτ−1(m˜) ≥K, then the additional arrival of m˜ would provide no value-add should
recipient j chooses to wait. In fact, ordering any item ranked m˜ + 1 onwards is suboptimal for recipient
i. Therefore, the expressions pi0i (µ) or E[pi
1
i (µ+ )] are given by the respective optimal solutions from
Proposition 7, i.e., vi ·y∗i whenever vi = (vi,1, . . . , vi,m) that can be used as inputs for completing Table 1.
B. Proofs
Proposition 1 (i). (O,O) is an equilibrium if and only if ΠO,O1 (µ) ≥ ΠW,O1 (µ) and ΠO,O2 (µ) ≥ ΠO,W2 (µ).
These equations are always satisfied since ΠW,O1 (µ) = Π
O,W
2 (µ) = 0, therefore (O,O) is always an equilibrium.
The (W,O) and (O,W ) strategies are dominated by (O,O) for both players.
(ii). The condition δ > max
(
δ¯1
p1
, δ¯2
p2
)
implies that δ > δ¯i
pi
=
pi0i
piE[pi
1
i
]
⇔ δpiE[pi1i ] > pi0i for i = 1,2. Under the
R-model, these are equivalent to ΠW,W1 (µ)>Π
O,W
1 (µ) and Π
W,W
2 (µ)>Π
W,O
2 (µ). Hence, (W,W ) is an equi-
librium.
(iii). Our final objective is to compare WO,OR and W
W,W
R for δ > max(δ¯1, δ¯2). Then W
O,O
R = p1pi
0
1 + p2pi
0
2 <
δ(p1E[pi
1
1 ] + p2E[pi
1
2 ]) =W
W,W
R . This is because δ > δ¯i is equivalent to δE[pi
1
i ]>pi
0
i for i= 1,2. 
Proposition 2 (i) We want to characterize G()
.
= {(K,µ) : δpiE[pi1i ]− pi0i > 0,∀i} in terms of capacity
decision. For our purpose, we analyze (5) by letting
gi(K) =−(1− piδ)(Kvi,−i +µi∆i) + δpi∆iE[min(K −µi, i)].
(W,W ) is an equilibrium for those K for which g1(K) and g2(K) are simultaneously positive. To characterize
G(), we characterize the g1 and g2 functions.
We note that gi(0) < 0 and gi(µi) < 0 since i is a non-negative random variable. Let Fi and fi be the
c.d.f. and p.d.f. for i, respectively. We have
d
dK
gi(K) =−(1− piδ)vi,−i + δpi∆i(1−Fi(K −µi)). (10)
d2
dK2
gi(K) =
{
0 if K ≤ µi;
−fi(K −µi)δpi∆i o/w.
Case 1: Let
v1,2
v1,1
≥ δp1 or v2,1v2,2 ≥ δp2. We will show that at least one of ddK gi(K)< 0 for all K > 0, which
implies that G() =∅. Without loss of generality, let us assume that v1,2
v1,1
≥ δp1. This condition implies that
d
dK
g1(K) =−(1− p1δ)v1,2 + δp1∆1 =−v1,2 + δp1v1,1 < 0 over the interval K ∈ (0, µ1). Let us observe what
happens for K ∈ [µ1,∞). We define ϕi = F−11
(
δpivi,i−vi,−i
δpi(vi,i−vi,−i)
)
, then the sign of the derivative in (10) becomes
d
dK
gi(K) =
{≥ 0, if µi ≤K ≤ µi +ϕi;
< 0, if K >µi +ϕi.
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Now
v1,2
v1,1
≥ δp1 also implies that ϕ1 = 0 and so, we have ddK g1(µ1) = 0. For K > µ1, the sign of ddK g1(K) is
again negative. In other words, the slope of g1(K) is always negative over all non-negative range of capacity.
Together with g(µ1)< 0, we conclude that (5) is negative for recipient 1 and thus, G() =∅.
Case 2: Let
vi,−i
vi,i
< δpi. For K ∈ (0, µi), vi,−ivi,i < δpi implies that ddK g1(K) =−vi,−i + δpivi,i > 0. Combining
with the slope of gi(K) over [µi,∞), we obtain
d
dK
gi(K) =
{≥ 0, if 0≤K ≤ µi +ϕi;
< 0, if K >µi +ϕi.
Since gi(K) is concave on [µi,∞), gi(µi) < 0, limK→∞ gi(K) < 0, and gi attains its maximum at µi + ϕi,
if gi(µi + ϕi) > 0, then there exist two capacity levels Kˆi(µ) and K¯i(µ) such that µi < Kˆi(µ) < K¯i(µ),
gi(Kˆi(µ)) = 0 and gi(K¯i(µ)) = 0. We choose Kˆ(µ) = max(Kˆ1(µ), Kˆ2(µ)) and K¯(µ) = min(K¯1(µ), K¯2(µ)).
If gi(µi +ϕi)≤ 0, then G() =∅.
(ii) We want to characterize G() = {(K,µ) : δpiE[pi1i ]−pi0i > 0,∀i} in terms of the inventory level. In this
case, (5) can be rewritten as:
hi(µi) =−(1− piδ)(Kvi,−i +µi∆i) + δpi∆iE[min(K −µi, i)]
=−(1− piδ)Kvi,−i + δpi∆iE[min(K −µi, i)]− (1− piδ)µi∆i.
The term −(1− piδ)Kvi,−i is constant and δpi∆iE[min(K −µi, i)]− (1− piδ)µi∆i is strictly decreasing in
µi. This is because
d
dµi
hi(µi) = −∆i(1− δpiFi(K − µi)) < 0. As limy→∞ hi(y) < 0, if hi(0) > 0, then there
exists Ii(K) such that gi(Ii(K)) = 0. If hi(0)> 0, then let Ii(K) = 0. Then
recipient i’s optimal action =
{
orders, if µi ≥ Ii(K);
waits, if µi < Ii(K).
Thus, we choose I(K) = (I1(K), I2(K)) and both recipients wait whenever µ≤ I(K).
(iii) Let  ≤st ′ = (′1, ′2) and G(′) = {(K,µ) : δpiE[pˆi1i ] > pi0i } where pˆi1i = ∆imin(K,µi + ′i) +Kvi,−i.
We want to show that G() ⊆ G(′).  ≤st ′ implies E[f()] ≤ E[f(′)] for any non-decreasing function f ,
provided the expectation exists (see Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007)). Pick (K,µ) ∈ G(). Given that
≤st ′ and min(K,µi + y) is increasing in y ∈R+, we must have
δpiE[pˆi
1
i ] = ∆iE[min(K,µi + 
′
i)] +Kvi,−i ≥∆iE[min(K,µi + i)] +Kvi,−i = δpiE[pi1i ]>pi0i .
Thus, we have (K,µ)∈G(′). 
Proposition 3 (i) Let µ≤µ′. Our goal is to show that at higher inventory levels, the range of capacity that
sustains the (W,W ) equilibrium gets reduced. Define g′i(K) =−(1− piδ)(Kvi,−i +µ′i∆i) + δpi∆iE[min(K −
µ′i, i)]. Suppose Kˆi(µ
′) and K¯i(µ′) solve g′i(K) = 0. It suffices to show that Kˆi(µ) ≤ Kˆi(µ′) and K¯i(µ) ≥
K¯i(µ
′). These (together with Proposition 2) will imply that
Kˆ(µ) = max(Kˆ1(µ), Kˆ2(µ))≤max(Kˆ1(µ′), Kˆ2(µ′)) = Kˆ(µ′)
K¯(µ) = min(K¯1(µ), K¯2(µ))≥min(K¯1(µ′), K¯2(µ′)) = K¯(µ′)
⇒ (Kˆ(µ′), K¯(µ′))⊆ (Kˆ(µ), K¯(µ)).
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Since µ≤µ′, the strict decreasing property of hi(µi) in µi implies that
gi(K) =−(1− piδ)(Kvi,−i +µi∆i) + δpi∆iE[min(K −µi, i)]
≥−(1− piδ)(Kvi,−i +µ′i∆i) + δpi∆iE[min(K −µ′i, i)].
Therefore, gi(K¯i(µ
′))≥ g′i(K¯i(µ′)) = 0. Due to the concavity of gi(K) in K > 0, we have K¯i(µ′)≤ K¯i(µ). In
a similar vein, we have gi(Kˆi(µ
′))≥ g′i(Kˆi(µ′)) = 0. Therefore, Kˆi(µ)≤ Kˆi(µ′). The result is proven.
(ii) Let ≤st ′. We want to show that for a stochastically larger arrival distribution, the capacity range
supporting (W,W ) becomes larger, i.e., (Kˆ(µ), K¯(µ)) ⊆ (Kˆ ′(µ), K¯ ′(µ)). It suffices to show that Kˆ ′(µ) ≤
Kˆ(µ) and K¯(µ)≤ K¯ ′(µ). Since min(y,x) is a non-decreasing function in x (see Shaked and Shanthikumar
(2007)), we have
gi(K)≤−(1− piδ)(Kvi,−i +µi∆i) + δpi∆iE[min(K −µi, ′i)]. (11)
As Kˆ ′(µ) is the lower bound of G(′) that produces zero on the RHS of (11), we have gi(Kˆ ′(µ)) ≤ 0.
Furthermore, the bound Kˆ(µ) satisfies gi(Kˆ(µ)) = 0, implying that gi(Kˆ
′(µ))≤ gi(Kˆ(µ)). Over K <µi+ϕi,
gi(K) is increasing and thus, Kˆ
′(µ)≤ Kˆ(µ). For K >µi +ϕi, gi(K) is decreasing and thus, K¯ ′(µ)≥ K¯(µ).
(iii) Recall that the inventory bound defining G(′) 6=∅ is given by I(K) = (I1(K), I2(K)), where Ii(K)
satisfies −(1−piδ)(Kvi,−i+Ii(K)∆i)+δpi∆iE[min(K−Ii(K), i)] = 0. Taking first and second order deriva-
tives w.r.t K, we have
− (1− piδ)(vi.−i + I ′i(K)∆i) + δpi∆i(1− I ′i(K))(1−Fi(K − Ii(K))) = 0
− (1− piδ)I ′′i (K)∆i + δpi∆i[−I
′′
i (K)(1−Fi(K − Ii(K)))− (1− I ′i(K))2fi(K − Ii(K))] = 0.
On rearranging, we have
I ′i(K) =
δpi∆i(1−Fi(K − Ii(K)))− (1− piδ)vi,−i
∆i(1− δpiFi(K − Ii(K)))
I
′′
(K) =
−δpi∆i(1− I ′i(K))2fi(K − Ii(K))
∆i(1− δpiFi(K − Ii(K))) .
Therefore, Ii(K) is strictly concave on K > 0. Therefore, I(I1(K), I2(K)) is component-wise concave in
K > 0.
(iv) Let ≤st ′. We want to show that for a stochastically larger arrival distribution, the bound on G()
defined by the inventory levels increases. It suffices to show that Ii(K)≤ I ′i(K) whenever I ′i(K) that satisfies
−(1− piδ)(Kvi,−i +µi∆i) + δpi∆iE[min(K −µi, ′i)] = 0. In a similar argument to (11),
hi(I
′
i(K))≤−(1− piδ)(Kvi,−i +µi∆i) + δpi∆iE[min(K −µi, ′i)] = 0 = hi(Ii(K)).
Given that hi(y) is decreasing in y > 0 and hi(I
′
i(K))≤ hi(Ii(K)), we have I ′i(K)≥ Ii(K). This implies that
I′(K) = (I ′1(K), I
′
2(K))≥ (I1(K), I2(K)) = I(K). 
Proposition 4 This follows from Proposition 2(i), where we show that under the stated conditions, G() =
∅. 
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Proposition 5 Our goal is to show that WR ≤WSR. Observe that we have
ΠSRi = max(pi
0
i , δE[pi
1
i ]) =
1
pi
max(ΠO,Oi ,Π
W,W
i )⇒ piΠSRi ≥max(ΠO,Oi ,ΠW,Wi ).
The welfare generated by MSRO based on the realized equilibrium under R−model:
WR =
{
ΠO,O1 + Π
O,O
2 , if δ≤ δ¯;
ΠW,W1 + Π
W,W
2 , if δ > δ¯.
Therefore, we have WSR = p1Π
SR
1 + p2Π
SR
2 ≥max(ΠO,O1 ,ΠW,W1 ) + max(ΠO,O2 ,ΠW,W2 )≥WR. 
Proposition 6 Our goal is to show that WP ≥WR. To do so, let us define W ′SR = max(ΠSR1 ,ΠSR2 ). This is
the welfare generated by the MSRO that assigns inventory access to the recipient with the highest expected
payoff. We proceed as follows: (i) We show that W ′SR ≥WSR, i.e., the welfare by assigning access to the
recipient with the highest expected payoff dominates WSR, the randomized selection for exclusive access, (ii)
the welfare generated by P−model dominates, i.e., WP ≥W ′SR.
(i) To show that W ′SR ≥WSR, we note that since p1 + p2 = 1, we have
W ′SR = p1 max(Π
SR
1 ,Π
SR
2 ) + p2 max(Π
SR
1 ,Π
SR
2 )≥ p1ΠSR1 + p2ΠSR2 =WSR.
(ii) To show WP ≥W ′SR, we note that since
Wp = max(max(pi
0
1 , pi
0
2), δE[max(pi
1
1 , pi
1
2))]
≥ δE[max(pi11 , pi12)]≥ δmax(E[pi11 ],E[pi12 ]).
The second inequality comes from applying Jensen’s inequality. The definition of Wp also implies that Wp ≥
max(pi01 , pi
0
2). Therefore, we have
Wp ≥max(max(pi01 , pi02), δmax(E[pi11 ],E[pi12 ]))
= max(max(pi01 , δE[pi
1
1 ]),max(pi
0
2 , δE[pi
1
2 ])) = max(Π
SR
1 ,Π
SR
2 ) =W
′
SR.
Once we establish (i) and (ii), the proof follows from Proposition 5 since WSR ≥WR. 
